Spain, Ceuta and Israel: why Israelis should distinguish between the Spanish government and the Spanish People

• Ceuta was the target of an organized hybrid attack—not a spontaneous migration event. Spain faced a coordinated mass incursion into sovereign Spanish territory. Ceuta has been under Spanish sovereignty for more than five centuries, and its residents are Spanish citizens. Such an operation could not have taken place without the active consent, coordination, or support of the Moroccan authorities. It should be understood as an act of hybrid warfare.

• Israelis should instinctively recognize the feeling of a breached border. While the events in Ceuta are fundamentally different from the terrorist atrocities of October 7, the psychological dimension is familiar: the shock of seeing national borders overwhelmed, the fear for families and communities, and the sense that state sovereignty has been directly challenged.

• Spain’s government and the Spanish people are not the same. Since October 7, the Spanish government has adopted one of the most hostile positions toward Israel in the democratic world, frequently employing rhetoric that has demonized, delegitimized and criminalized Israel, its institutions and, at times, its society. Organizations such as ACOM have consistently challenged that narrative from within Spain.

• The initial Israeli emotional reaction is understandable. Given the Spanish government’s hostility after October 7, it is humanly understandable that some Israelis reacted with irony, sarcasm or even schadenfreude when Spain experienced a serious challenge to its borders.

• But strategic judgment should prevail over emotion. Those capable of looking beyond the immediate emotional response should recognize that insulting or alienating the Spanish people is neither fair nor strategically intelligent.

• Spain remains one of Europe’s major democracies. It is a country of almost 50 million people and an important European nation. Israel gains nothing by unnecessarily alienating Spanish public opinion.

• Modern Spain is not an antisemitic society. Medieval history is not an accurate guide to contemporary Spain, just as it would not be for England, France, Germany or Switzerland. Today’s Spain is a constitutional democracy whose population is not fundamentally antisemitic. The hostility comes from its current government, not from Spanish society.

• Conflating Spain with Sánchez only strengthens Sánchez. By portraying all Spaniards as hostile to Israel, Israeli commentators inadvertently reinforce the Spanish government’s own narrative of confrontation. Rather than weakening Sánchez politically, they provide him with exactly the external enemy he seeks.

• Criticism should be directed at the government—not at the nation. If Israel wants to influence Spanish public opinion, it should distinguish clearly between an unpopular government and the Spanish people themselves.

• Sánchez has already exploited Israeli overreactions. Some statements by Israeli officials and commentators allowed Sánchez and his media allies to shift attention away from Morocco’s responsibility for the events in Ceuta and instead manufacture a controversy about Israel.The real story was Morocco’s actions. The discussion should have remained focused on Morocco’s organized use of migration as political pressure against Spain. Allowing the debate to become about Israeli reactions only benefited Sánchez.

• The United States demonstrated a far more effective approach. Washington expressed solidarity with Spain and the Spanish people while simultaneously criticizing the Sánchez government’s immigration and border policies. It separated the country from its government instead of conflating the two.

• That is the strategically intelligent response. Supporting the Spanish people while criticizing Sánchez attracts potential allies within Spain instead of pushing them away.

• Morocco’s government and Moroccan society should also be distinguished. Israel rightly values Morocco’s participation in the Abraham Accords and its current strategic cooperation. However, Morocco is not a democracy, and public opinion remains overwhelmingly hostile toward Israel and Jews.

• The history of Moroccan Jewry should not be romanticized. Around 250,000 Jews once lived in Morocco. After 1948, the overwhelming majority emigrated—not only to Israel, but also to France, Spain and Canada. They did not leave because coexistence was idyllic. They left because many no longer believed their security, dignity and future could be guaranteed.

• Morocco fought against Israel. During the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Morocco deployed troops to fight alongside the Arab coalition against Israel. For decades thereafter Morocco maintained no diplomatic relations with Israel. Full normalization came only in 2020 through the Abraham Accords.

• Spain established diplomatic relations with Israel long before Morocco did. Spain recognized and established diplomatic relations with Israel in 1986. Morocco only restored full diplomatic relations thirty-four years later, in 2020.

• The Jewish communities themselves tell the real story. Today, the combined Jewish communities of the Spanish cities of Ceuta and Melilla are roughly comparable in size to the entire remaining Jewish population of the Kingdom of Morocco. That fact speaks volumes about where Jews have felt sufficiently secure to live openly, build institutions and practice their faith.

• The contrast is revealing. Morocco today enjoys a government friendly to Israel, yet its historic Jewish community has almost disappeared. Spain currently has one of Europe’s most hostile governments toward Israel, yet its Jewish community continues to grow within a constitutional democracy that guarantees religious freedom and equal citizenship.

• Governments change; societies endure. Morocco’s current government deserves recognition for its cooperation with Israel, but it should not be confused with Moroccan public opinion. Likewise, Spain’s current government should not be mistaken for Spanish society. Democracies elect new governments; societies are far more enduring.

• Israel should not help Sánchez build the divide he wants. Sánchez’s political strategy depends in part on portraying Israel as hostile to Spain. Every indiscriminate attack on Spain or Spaniards helps validate that narrative and gives political oxygen to one of Israel’s most hostile governments in Europe.

• Israeli commentators already understand this distinction elsewhere. No serious Israeli commentator would describe all Americans as antisemitic because New York elected an anti-Israel mayor, nor would they insult New Yorkers collectively because of the views of one politician. They instinctively distinguish governments, politicians and societies. Spain deserves exactly the same treatment.

• The strategic objective should be obvious. Israel’s long-term interest is not to alienate Spanish society but to win it over. Solidarity with the Spanish people, combined with firm criticism of the Sánchez government and clear condemnation of Morocco’s hybrid aggression, is not only morally sound—it is also the most intelligent strategic response.